| |
|
| |
|
Silvio Micali
TTI-C Distinguished Lecturer Series, MIT - CSAIL
Rational Secure Computation and Ideal Mechanism Design
March 16, 2006 3:00pm
Abstract:
We prove a general result bridging the fields of Secure Protocols and Game Theory.
In game-theoretic terms, we show that ANY mediated game with incomplete information can be perfectly simulated by the players alone, by means of an extensive-form game in which the trusted mediator is replaced by a ballot box---the venerable device used throughout the world to privately and correctly compute the tally of secret votes.
In cryptographic terms, we show that, in ANY joint computation, security can be achieved based solely on the players’ RATIONALITY, rather than on the HONESTY of some of them.
Our result has broad implications for Mechanism Design; in particular, it enables One to design mechanisms in a MODULAR and COMPETITIVE fashion.
Joint work with Sergei Izmalkov and Matt Lepinski
If you have questions, or would like to meet the speaker, please contact Ponda at 4-1994 or pondabarnes@tti-c.org. For information on future TTI-C talks or events, please go to the TTI-C Events page.